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INTRODUCTION
T he government or public sector of most nations typically accounts for between onequarter and one-half of all economic activity. Yet the criteria that we evaluate the effectiveness of such services is not automatic, as it is in private business enterprise due to the disciplining effect of the market, but must be imposed. Democratic mechanisms function to both reward and discipline political parties and thus to create incentives to improve public services. However, in the short run, the evaluation of the management and provision of public assets and services rely on criteria of efficiency.
There is a vast literature on the economics of government services, optimal policy, social and public choice theory and political economy that is based on a framework of instruments and targets, or mechanisms and goals, as evaluated in terms of efficiency. This is both in terms of the goal (e.g. Pareto efficiency for an allocative goal) and also the means by which it is achieved, such that some mechanisms may be more efficient than others in achieving the same goal (e.g. an income distribuThe innovation deficit in public services: The curious problem of too much efficiency and not enough waste and failure tion target, or a target level of production of a service). It is thus a widely held axiom that public sector management of assets and provision of services is properly evaluated as effective when it is judged to be efficient. In consequence, improvements in the management of public assets and in the provision of public services are then implicitly defined as anything that renders these services more efficient (or less inefficient). However, this evaluation criterion is only meaningfully defined with respect to assets and services that already exist. It excludes from the outset criteria that relate to the innovation of new services or even the elimination of services because the efficiency criterion is meaningless in such cases. This, in essence, is why innovation is difficult in the public sector. The goal of efficiency is inconsistent with the goal of innovation. Put differently, this is why one-half to three-quarters of the economy remains in the private sector where this inconsistency does not hold. Now although considerations of economic efficiency do not of course entirely determine the nature and shape of all public policy and government actions -for these are also driven by political expediencies, citizen pressures and realpolitik -it remains a widely held axiom of both effective policy and good governance that to go strongly against considerations of economic efficiency makes for bad policy. This is easily witnessed in public demand for, and government accord with, the general sensibilities of transparency, accountability and efficiency in the conduct of government economic intervention in the drafting of regulation, the use of public money and the management of public assets. Yet I shall argue here against this seemingly sensible proposition by noting the implications of it going too far: indeed, I shall specifically argue the benefits of a reduction in efficiency.
I am of course not arguing that public policy and governance can be improved by a significant increase in inefficiency, in the sense of indiscriminate waste and corruption. Rather, I seek to discriminate between different sorts of waste (as the opposite of efficiency). I shall distinguish between 'bad waste' due to rent-seeking and 'good waste' as the cost of experimentation. I shall then argue that the much vaunted aspiration toward universal efficiency in the public sector has indeed successfully eliminated much 'bad waste', but at the price of also eliminating much 'good waste' as well. And in doing so, it has constricted innovation. I shall seek to explain the logic of how this situation has arisen, why it is a problem, and what might be done to remedy it.
GOVERNMENT IS A SERVICE
Our starting point is that government (and governance in general) is a service. It provides services of defence, law and order, transport and communications infrastructure, health services, education services, social services, regulatory services, and so on. Some of these services can of course be provided wholly or in part by the private sector, but there are often good reasons associated with information asymmetries, free-rider problems or difficulty of defining and enforcing property rights that underpin a 'market failure' rationale for public supply of such services. The point remains, however, that although government is outside the 'price mechanism' in these circumstances it is not outside 'the economy'. Rather, it is still fundamentally part of the economy as a provider of valuable services. That is why it is legitimate to talk about the efficiency of government services. Yet this is also why it is equally legitimate to talk about uncertainty, enterprise and innovation in the economics of government services.
At this point, however, debate usually fixes on the question of comparative efficiency: i.e. for any given service (say geriatric health care), and for given citizen or consumer preferences and incomes, what then is the most efficient way of achieving that goal? But in formulating the question in this way we have implicitly presumed to deal with a static conception of both government and the economy. We have implicitly presumed that: (a) there is one best way of achieving the goal efficiently; (b) that it is known or knowable by someone; and (c) that this best solution can then be rationally chosen and implemented. Any failure along this line leads to inefficiency, which is of course bad. Yet note that, in this view, there is no place for innovation. Innovation, along with uncertainty, entrepreneurship, imagination, experimentation, competitive enterprise and technological and structural change are excluded, by definition, because of the initial presumption that the one best solution is already known (or knowable) and that the problem effectively lies only in its implementation. The rational pursuit of efficiency denies the very existence of innovation.
Of course there is no shortage of recognition of the need for innovation in the provision of public services (Golden 1990; Osbourne 1998a Osbourne , 1998b Newman et al 2001; Bhatta 2003; Mulgan and Albury 2003; Walker 2003 Walker , 2006 Kanarck 2004; Hartley 2005; Albury 2005 ). Furthermore, economic commentators are often resolute about the need for efficiency in public services while simultaneously making perennial calls for the promotion of innovation in public services. Yet there is little recognition that these two goals are mutually inconsistent (Parsons 2006) . This is a curious situation, as the study of innovation in services is a well-developed component of industrial economic analysis (e.g. Gallouj and Weinstein 1997 , Metcalfe and Miles 2000 , OECD 2001 , Tether 2003 , Miles 2004 ) and a significant explanation for economic growth (e.g. Riddle 1986 , Romer 1994 ). There is a broad understanding in the economics of innovation literature that the innovation process requires experimentation and a high tolerance over organizations and institutions for both risk-taking and failure (Dodgson et al 2005) . Yet the pursuit of efficiency involves, effectively, the very opposite of this, namely risk aversion, intolerance for experimentation, and a preference for proven 'winners'. It is surprising, therefore, that this basic point has seemingly been so widely overlooked in the analysis of public sector innovation.
The incentives and outcomes in the 'production of public services' industry (i.e. government) in stable modern 'rule of law' democracies are now often efficient, transparent and accountable, yet the incentives and outcomes to innovation remain exceedingly poor (Albury 2005) . One possible explanation is that government is a monopoly service provider and, like all monopolies, experiences little pressure to innovate (Schumpeter 1945 ). Yet this argument is flawed. Monopolies do innovate, and often powerfully because there are very few entirely 'uncontestable' monopolies (Baumol 2002, Dopfer and Potts 2008) . A local or national government does have an effective monopoly on a range of services at a point in time, yet in a democratic system this monopoly will be periodically contested. Furthermore, leadership in the upper-management of such monopolies is also highly contestable, engendering implicit competition between aspiring managers in the creation and promotion of new ideas. Thus we have a puzzle. Governance is a service and, in a competitive or contestable environment, services must continually innovate to survive. Yet while it is now broadly accepted in principle and increasingly in practice that government services should aim for levels of efficiency on par with private sector organizations, there is little corresponding recognition that the parallel aim for innovation in government services that is on par with innovation practices and outcomes achieved in the market service economy is a fundamental contradiction. The goal of efficiency 'crowds out' the goal of innovation.
As such, a plausible explanation for the widely observed and much lamented deficit of innovation in government services is that it is a byproduct of the drive to efficiency and the elimination of both 'good waste' as well as 'bad waste'. In other words, in a system governed by public accountability that is premised on the achievement of efficiency and innovation you will either get efficiency or innovation, but not both. There are no simple solutions to this, although I will detail some possible ways forward that involve a re-assessment of what is meant and implied by public accountability. But first, con-sider why this is a non-trivial and non-convergent (i.e. endemic) problem.
AN EVOLVING ECONOMY REQUIRES EVOLVING POLICY
Economic growth and structural change is a 'normal process' that occurs when a certain minimal set of institutional conditions and freedoms prevail. Furthermore, the process of economic growth is never just a simple scaling-up of existing activities and structures, but involves endogenous transformation of the economy from within as new technologies, business plans and suchlike are originated, adopted and retained by the economic system. This creative-destructive process is known as economic evolution (Nelson and Winter 1982 , Metcalfe 1998 , Loasby 1999 , Potts 2000 , Beinhocker 2006 , Dopfer and Potts 2008 . Economic evolution is caused by economic innovation. It results in structural change in the economic system in consequence of new ideas, along with change in the capabilities, organization, connections, boundaries and behaviour of the micro units that compose the economic system and the connections between them.
An economic system in equilibrium (i.e. one that is not evolving) has no need of new policy, for it will be in equilibrium with respect to the extant policy settings and services provided. Also, an economy that is growing in the manner envisaged in neoclassical growth models (in which the economy expands equally and everywhere by some percentage each year) has no need of new policy or services, because the same public services can then be provided at a similarly expanded level. This would happen automatically as the tax base grew proportionately. Public sector innovation is thus unnecessary in an economy in equilibrium or an economy experiencing equilibrium (scaled-up) growth. In such a context, public sector efficiency is the only economic concern.
Yet this is neither necessarily nor even generally true in an evolving economy because evolutionary growth, by definition, implies change in the underlying capabilities and relations between agents changing the structure of the economic order. In an evolving economy, a static (or scaled) structure of policy and services will become increasingly dysfunctional or inappropriate. It will be adapted to an economic world that, by increment, no longer exists. Economic evolution thus renders extant policy settings increasingly dysfunctional. Let us call this policy entropy. Policy entropy does not exist in a static economy, and thus requires no innovation. But an evolving economy requires policy innovation and not just the increased efficiency or scalingup of existing policy.
The process of innovation and economic evolution continually changes the economic order from within, and hence needs to be met with a continuous flow of novel policy ideas, including the termination of old ideas that no longer work or are devolving into sources of rent. Yet because economic evolution is the product of novelty and the growth of knowledge (Loasby 1999 ) new policy will need to be experimentally created and tested. Its efficacy cannot be known a priori for the same reason that new private sector enterprises and services cannot be known a priori. Experimentation will be necessary and its costs will be unavoidable. It is these experimental costs associated with policy innovation that directly clash with the goals of static efficiency in policy.
Naturally some and perhaps many policy experiments (Leigh 2003) will fail, and sometimes expensively. Yet this is an essential price to pay for governance and policy to simply keep pace with an evolving economy. Economic evolution implies policy entropy which thus requires policy innovation just to maintain current service (a point we return to below as the 'Red Queen' hypothesis). Policy innovation is not therefore only about 'going forward' in pursuit of better governance as it is often sold, but rather, as a base-line case, is about simply maintaining position. The upshot is that in an evolving economy, the strident pursuit of policy efficiency may actually result in less effective or well-adapted policy.
This sort of dynamic efficiency with respect to policy is necessary in an evolving economy. Yet the governance of a complex evolving system is often stifled by a zero-risk attitude to governance that is incentivized to that position in the short run by the widely perceived need to be efficient: in the sense of being transparent, accountable, precautionary, fair and equitable. Yet for policy to be effective, it must keep pace with ongoing economic change, which means that it must innovate, which then places it in direct contradiction to many of these aspects of efficiency. However, that does not change the underlying fact that an innovative evolving economy requires, indeed mandates, an innovative approach to policy. How, then, might this dilemma be resolved?
GOOD WASTE AND BAD WASTE
The upshot is that continuous innovation is required for policy and government services to remain effective in an evolving economy. Yet innovation is by definition wasteful because good policy solutions and service provisions cannot be known in advance. Yet we need more, not less, of this sort of waste.
To be clear, efficiency is indisputably good, but the opposite of efficiency is not always bad. An important distinction thus needs to be made between good waste (the necessary but unknown costs of experimentation) and bad waste (the costs of inefficiency). Bad waste is the consequence of rent-seeking that comes by degrees of corruption and exploitation of power. This is well understood, and the mark of good governance is the absence of such waste, i.e. static efficiency. Good waste, on the other hand is less well understood and indeed often unrecognized, yet it is the natural consequence of experiments in the course of innovation in developing new ideas, technologies or policies. This is the cost of learning that is systematically factored into research and development budgets, for example, or in the amortized costs of learning about new technologies or market opportunities. Many of the most successful and profitable companies produce large quantities of 'good waste', and are often as such precisely because they have learnt how to effectively do so (Dodgson et al 2005) . Good governance, in this view, thus involves minimizing bad waste from rent-seeking and maximizing good waste from experimentation.
Waste therefore arises from a failure to organize and use scarce resources efficiently: thus government waste, in this view, is bad governance. This may arise due to information imperfections, organizational slack, rent-seeking and corruption, institutional friction, transaction costs, market failure, government failures, abuse of power, rationality failures and the full complement of potential failures of the competitive market outcome. These are all bad waste in the sense that they are Pareto inefficient, meaning that changes could be made to make some agents better off without making others worse off. Things could be better, yet the natural and artificial limitations of material reality intervene, causing waste. The solution, then, is to remove these imperfections and frictions by promoting efficiency. Bad waste thus always involves rent-seeking and invariably results in sub-optimal resource allocations. Sometimes this is obvious, as in persistent market shortages or artificially high prices, or when dubious or illegal dealings are revealed. The waste from such activities is morally unambiguous and rightfully prosecuted.
Yet there are lesser and more everyday forms of waste that while no less wasteful in proportion are now widely, yet inappropriately from the evolutionary perspective, afforded the mantle of good governance. I refer here to the systematic tendency toward risk aversion that comes to distrust the entrepreneurial gamble or the experimental endeavour because it might fail to meet specific expectations based on knowable extrapolations of extant conditions that would render it unaccountable. In essence, it is the distrust of imagination with public resources. This is the point of much confusion of bad waste and good waste.
This form of distrust is more politely known as transparency and accountability. Yet it leads inexorably to a creeping strangulation of risk that can ossify the governance structures of a compa-ny, city, region or nation. When this happens, the cost is the loss of the ability of the governed system to change and grow through imaginative experimental endeavour in order to meet new environmental threats and opportunities. The result is a fragile system (Parsons 2006) . This is of course subtle and opaque, but by degrees it is all bad waste. Accountability in this context only ever extends to failures of practice, never to failures of imagination. Yet it is simple arithmetic that large amounts of small corruption are as significant as small amounts of large corruption. Yet only the latter attracts media, civic, shareholder or voter attention. The implication is that the drive to increased transparency and accountability to promote efficiency and to fight egregious corruption has had an unfortunate side-effect by inducing a kind of 'soft corruption' -by which I mean corruption in the sense of increasing dysfunction of a system, not as a moral failing -to favour the known quantity and the sure-thing that works to promote a systematic aversion to uncertainty, risk and experimentation. The present demands of efficiency thus quietly, and with all best intentions, slowly strangle the ongoing possibility of innovation.
This brings us to the other sort of waste -good waste -which is a natural consequence of learning and experimentation. Waste is inevitable, not just because of the second law of thermodynamics, but also because of how economies and societies evolve and progress through differential growth (Metcalfe 1998) . All economic growth is a consequence of the ongoing process of variation and selection of the ideas and knowledge of an economy that define what it does and what it can do (Potts 2000 , Dopfer et al 2004 , Dopfer and Potts 2008 . New ideas are the origin of economic growth and are produced through a process of trying many ideas and then learning from what doesn't work and replicating what does (Loasby 1999) . Theory and analysis do of course help in this process, but the best way to grow a company, region or economy is still to try lots of things and then select from what works. This can of course be guided by theory and principles, and so will be far from random. But in an open world it will still require experimentation, and experimentation necessarily involves waste (Ormerod 2005) .
But this is good waste, and indeed is a necessary waste for a progressive and growing economy or society. Public goods are created by a process that begins with political entrepreneurship and enterprise and ends with an ongoing order (i.e. a firm organized about an idea or technology or a bureaucracy organized about a policy). Except when it doesn't, which is when an idea has failed. Yet this 'operational expense' is not a 'generic loss' if lessons can be learned; which will be true to the extent that the endeavour was appropriately conceived as an experiment from the start (Burtless 1995 , Leigh 2003 . Good waste is the consequence of experimentation that leads to learning that then feeds back into innovation in governance and opportunity. Learning naturally involves mistakes and post-hoc waste.
Yet being wasteful in an effective way is hard: it is not easy to 'waste' money well. Best practise is always to spend public or shareholder money in a transparent, accountable and efficient manner. It is easy to do what the average voter wants, which is, by the very definition of the arithmetic mean, to not take risks. Those who support risktaking experimentation are always in the tails of the distribution. As such, the natural demands of transparency and accountability will tend to induce corporate, civil and public offices toward the risk adverse centre and away from imagination, uncertainty and experimentation. This is a rational strategy and the failing here is institutional, not personal. Yet the cost is born publicly, as good governance is associated with the promotion of efficiency and the avowal of the sorts of imagination-led risk-taking experiments that produce innovation.
It is of course far from my intention here to present or develop this argument as a critique of democracy. Rather, what I wish to emphasise is that within any democratic system of the public organization of asset ownership, management and service provision there are systematic biases against innovation that function through the promotion of public accountability and efficiency. Occasionally, of course, a charismatic leader can overcome these inherent biases and lead their people down a path of experimentation with full cognition of the risks and uncertainties involved. Yet these situations are rare and often correlated with desperate contexts linked to immediate threats. The fair-weather entrepreneurial politician remains a rare species.
The implication is that entrepreneurial innovation in public policy is discounted due to a public aggregate of what in behavioural economics is called 'loss aversion', or the tendency to value a statistically equivalent expected loss higher than the corresponding statistical gain. This paradox functions for known gains and losses, and is proportionately higher for unknown potential gains and losses. In terms of both individual rationality and social democracy, we all systematically underestimate the gains from novelty. Put differently, it is entirely human to overestimate the costs of 'good waste' and to underestimate potential gains from experimental learning. This is why efficiency is an easy political sell, but why innovation is hard. It is why efficiency and innovation seem logically connected when in fact they are not. It is why there remains a persistent innovation deficit in democratically organized public services.
EVOLVING POLICY
So, what might be done to remedy this seemingly intrinsic state of affairs? On one hand, there is an important role for public education about the actual nature of the need for policy experimentation based on the reality of economic evolution and its socio-cultural correlates in order to create a public climate of trust and willingness to proceed in such experimental ways along with the promotion of a tolerance of legitimate failure. This is obviously a fine line, as the very conditions implicit in this bargain are also the conditions that lead to the encroachment of unaccountable power. Accountability is vital, yet absolute accountability crowds out imagination and experimentation. The balance must then turn on accountability of process. But what is this?
The logical form of such a contract is an adaptive or evolutionary policy-making framework, which involves accepting at the outset that some of the things tried will fail (see Pelikan and Wegner 2003) . But, rather than focusing on the minimization of the risks associated with such failure, it is better to focus on the possibility and prospect of successful experiments. Policy rules then enter to ramp-up those initiatives that were successful into an ongoing process, and to then renew the process with new experiments in new directions updated by the knowledge acquired from the last round of experiments. Such an empirically adaptive policy approach would also be scientific policy. Yet like all scientific experiments, it would need to build into its expectations from the outset the near certainty that some failure will occur. Yet by properly accounting for failure, the prospect of innovation may become routine, not exceptional.
In other words, governments that can learn to take risks, and accept that perhaps much will fail in the short run, will succeed in the long run. The same is of course true and plainly observable of firms and, indeed, of people. Risk is essential to the renewal and regeneration of variety, and therefore to the growth of regions and companies alike. The purposeful and noble act of avoiding the immediate waste of public money through the promotion of efficiency may therefore actually lead to the long run waste of public money if it then leads to a loss of appetite for risk. The same argument can be made about shareholders seeking full accountability for short term returns. A good director is not always a good democrat, as neither should be a good civic leader. They should listen to the tails of the distribution as well, and perhaps even with prejudice, for these are where new ideas come from. And new ideas, once adopted, make for new voter averages.
No one likes being experimented on without their knowing, but we each and all regularly put ourselves in these positions for both utility and profit when the experiment is self-selected or complicit. There is no inherent reason that a body politic would not accept or even embrace adaptive policy experimentation if it is explained and accepted that that is what is occurring. Full disclosure is thus not inconsistent with limited accountability or political liability. (Note the comparison with the invention of limited liability trading companies and the onset of market capitalism as a force of innovation: no such political analogue yet exists, i.e. the 'limited liability' political experiment.) Instead, problems only arise when it is simultaneously insisted that this will not result in any failure or (good) waste. Yet that impossible bargain is often sold with the result of systematic political failure (cf. market failure) due to lack of innovation. It is an axiom of conservative thinking that the greatest damage a government can do is to waste public money. Yet, from the evolutionary perspective, there is something potentially worse: namely the failure to promote or to learn from experimentation, thus resulting in a political or bureaucratic order increasingly divergent from the evolving economic order (Hayek 1960 , Buchanan 2006 . The propensity toward not taking risks, and the corresponding inability to accept experimental failure, thus begins a downward spiral toward a slow strangulation and swallowing of the resources under governance. Eventually, and often inevitably, this will end in a blaze of rent-seeking once the opportunity is enclosed and captured. This is precisely the outcome that the focus on efficiency is intended to avoid, yet which by the incentivized neglect of policy innovation in an evolving economy eventually all but guarantees. The strategic rent seeking popularly thought to be overcome by the mandates of transparency and efficiency is, in this view, better realized through a mandate to experimental policy learning and innovation.
The promotion of public sector risk-taking is the basic antidote to such an entropic position in which the cost of 'good waste' is the evolutionary outcome of rational experimentation in the discovery of new opportunities and better policies. 'Bad waste' remains as it always was, namely something to be avoided. But it should not be confused with the innovation costs of political experimental endeavour. Bad waste has only public cost (with private benefit to those who corrupted the institution in their specific favour). Yet good waste, while publicly costly, may also be a necessary condition for public benefit in the form of policy innovation. In both scenarios there is public waste, i.e. public resources devoted to things that did not work out. Yet the difference is whether these benefits accrue privately or publicly.
So while inescapably 'political', the driving principles of adaptive policy should be properly 'experimental' and subject to strict methodological protocols (Burtless 1995 , Leigh 2003 . This should proceed in seeking to make conjectures about what systems or actions will produce public goods and then testing these hypotheses through public action. The purpose of experimentation is of course learning, followed by the analysis of this new knowledge and its communication and distribution to the society or economy under governance.
In this respect, government reports should then aim to be more like scientific papers, stating what was proposed, what experimental conditions held, and what was learnt. This sort of goal is normally recognized as being achieved only by research institutes, such as elite universities or public sector research organizations, but it should also be the goal of all systems with good governance to seek to develop new rules that might be usefully adopted and used by others. Whether this is driven by public or private organization is immaterial. What matters is that the outcome of the experimentation is appropriable learning about what creates value and how that can be applied. Civic and political leaders, as trustees of public wealth, should always seek to be great experimenters as well as great bureaucrats. The solution to the innovation deficit, in other words, is for political leaders to publicly act more like scientists, or political entrepreneurs, and for the public to learn to appreciate that role and to discriminate (at the ballot box, ultimately) their success or otherwise in doing so.
THE 'RED QUEEN' OF EVOLUTIONARY PUBLIC GOOD
In this view, the efficient production of waste is an evolutionary public good. Policy should then seek to be experimental in proportion to the rate and depth of economic change. In a static economy or 'closed society', there is no need for policy innovation, only policy efficiency. However, in an evolving economy or open society, policy and governance must continually experiment and innovate 'just to keep up'. This concept is known as the 'Red Queen' hypothesis in evolutionary biology (Ridley 1995) and argues, essentially, that a fitness increase in one system (e.g. the economy, due to innovation, i.e. 'running faster') will tend to lead to a fitness decrease in another system (e.g. government, due to lack of innovation, i.e. effectively 'running slower' even though nothing changed). I have suggested here that the 'Red Queen hypothesis' has a corollary in the need for public policy to be continually innovative just to stay in the same place with respect to the opportunity space of an evolving economy. Failure to achieve this will, in the limit, result in an accretion of rent-seeking that will eventually consume the systems it governs.
In biology, the mechanism by which this Red Queen process happens is sexual selection. In economics, it is market selection. In a democratic systems of governance, it is voter selection. In an open system, this leads to a positive feedback process in which competition proceeds by innovation: in biology, this is called an 'arms race'; in economics is it called the competitive process; and in politics it is called democracy. Yet in biology, economics and politics, dominance and power are regularly used to close a system to competition and feedback so as to maximize the exploitation of rents through the pursuit of efficiency. This paper has argued that the maintenance of a viable balance between the economy and the systems of governance that support it necessarily requires ongoing policy innovation. This is an experimental process that will, naturally, be wasteful. Yet that is not a bad thing, but rather is the evolutionary price that must be paid to maintain the very possibility of public sector viability and efficient governance in an open society.
Economists are sometimes prone to sweeping laissez faire arguments that discount all prospect of government endeavour to create and maintain public goods or to deny any possibility of efficiency in the management of public money. From the open system evolutionary/complexity perspective, however, the argument is somewhat different. Politics has evolved in a world of relatively slow change (Rubin 2002) in the technologies of economic systems (Beinhocker 2006 ), yet it is now very much the growth of knowledge through the market system that now drives the pace of human systems, and it is policy systems that must now run just to keep up. Recent decades have witnessed this disjunction in monetary and finance policy, media policy, immigration policy, climate policy, and so on. In an evolving economy, there will be an ongoing need for new policy solutions. The current incentive structure to the management of public assets and services, which is based about efficiency in terms of transparency and accountability, permits no rationalization of waste. Yet without such deliberate experimental waste (or dynamic investment) otherwise viable governance structures will eventually and inevitably be rendered non-viable by economic evolution. Economic evolution thus systematically induces policy entropy that can only be resolved through policy innovation, thus mandating both policy experimentation and operational waste. When the economy evolves, then so must policy. This is the proper and fundamental significance of innovation policy.
